University at Buffalo School of Law

Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law
Contributions to Books

Faculty Scholarship

2011

From the Welfare State to the Militarized Market: Losing Choices,
Controlling Losers
Martha T. McCluskey
University at Buffalo School of Law, mcclusk@buffalo.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/book_sections
Part of the Law and Society Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Martha T. McCluskey, From the Welfare State to the Militarized Market: Losing Choices, Controlling Losers
in Accumulating Insecurity: Violence and Dispossession in the Making of Everyday Life 27 (Shelley
Feldman, Charles Geisler & Gayatri A. Menon, eds., University of Georgia Press 2011)

© 2011 University of Georgia Press. No further redistribution or republication permitted.

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Contributions to Books by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

C H AP TER ONE

From the Welfare State
to the Militarized Market
Losing Choices, Controlling Losers
Martha T. McCluskey

By the end of the twentieth century, the ideology of the free market was a power
ful force pushing back against the growth of the welfare state both in the United
States and around the globe. According to that ideology, welfare state policies
spread neither prosperity nor security, but instead sacrificed individual free
dom for government control. That story contrasts the welfare state with a free
market where individuals rule by exercising the power to choose. In that storied
market, decentralized voluntary exchanges based on competitive calculations
of individual gain add up to maximize overall resources, so that individual self
interest benefits society as a whole. This idea helped justify a triumphant wave
of neoliberal policies claiming to unleash market risk and reward from egalitar
ian government regulation and spending (Yergin and Stanislaw 2002).
This chapter aims to help clarify the ideas challenging economic equality
and the possibilities for resisting those ideas by analyzing how the free market
story connects freedom of choice with unequal government control. The story
of market freedom has helped present neoliberalism’s increased insecurity and
upward distribution of economic gains as temporary bumps on a new road to
ward broad peace and prosperity rather than a sign of timeworn class politics.
Even as those bumps have grown to full-fledged economic crisis, following on
the heels of new waves of global political violence, the free market story retains
substantial power to resist new commitments to welfare state policies.
Alongside this neoliberal ideology and policy, a growing neoconservative
movement in the United States has also challenged the late twentieth-century
27
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welfare state through policies emphasizing forceful government moral control,
not public economic support, as the key to security and long-term political
freedom (Steinfels 1979). That moralistic authoritarianism was often presented
in opposition to market freedom, attributed in part to divisions between liber
tarian economics and communitarian morality within U.S. conservativism, or
between modernism and parochialism abroad.
But to the contrary, the prevailing free market ideology is itself grounded in
an embrace of expansive collective coercion and control that dovetails with the
more overtly authoritarian critique of welfare state policies. Market and moral
fundamentalism together support and legitimate a new vision where both po
litical liberty and economic security are denied to most people. Free market
ideology works to transform the idea of the democratic rule of law for the ben
efit of the people to the rule of force for enhancing the wealth of a few.
Two rhetorical steps have grounded the ideological formula justifying the
move from democratic governance to the rule of a militarized market. First,
inegalitarian policies that enforce losing choices for most are rationalized on the
grounds that these market policies promote freedom of choice. Second, welfare
state policies are identified with market losers whose security threatens others’
winnings, so that these losers need securing as much as security.
To some extent, the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008 burst the
popular and political illusion of individual choice bringing social abundance,
instead revealing a reality of immense and indiscriminate loss bearing down
from the mysterious and interdependent actions of an elite minority. The crisis
has also increased attention to the threat of market “winners” and their dispro
portionate and destructive government power, potentially replacing or deflect
ing efforts to scapegoat and police the growing number of market “losers.”
Yet this period of crisis and change also has brought enhanced opportunities
for wealthy elites to consolidate antidemocratic government power over others
as the way to restore market freedom and political security. Even in the face of
spectacular failures, the militarized market ideal retains substantial ideological
and institutional power to make increased economic security and democratic
freedom appear to be too costly. In a well-honed rhetorical formula, propo
nents of the militarized market construct the bad choices they have bequeathed
as the best of all possible worlds, explaining newly constrained choices and
horrific losses as the price of natural scarcity that must be paid to avoid further
destruction. As legal structures continue to provide unequal security against
loss, growing popular fear, despair, and distrust may produce pressure for con
centrated authority backed by force in place of broad participation in shared
economic and political power.
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As the global financial crisis unravels the proclaimed “freedom” of the fun
damentalist market, uncovering its dependence on lavish government support
and extensive private fraud, the rule of law needs to be revised as well as the
rule of markets. A crucial step toward undoing the militarized market will be to
restructure its rules to turn around the power to control economic choices so
that more people will be winners. In addition, replacing market fundamental
ism requires a shift from authoritarian control over market losers to democratic
control over the current market “choosers,” whose gains depend on imposing
staggering losses on others.
LEGALIZING THE WELFARE STATE

The United States’ move toward a welfare state in the first half of the twentieth
century grew out of a similar ideological and legal struggle over the question
of whether democratic controls on unequal economic power foster or hinder
a free society. Prior to 1937, Supreme Court decisions during what has come
to be called the Lochner era used the two-pronged rhetoric about choice and
control to block many legislative efforts to promote economic security for the
nonwealthy.
First, the Lochner era opinions defined democratic efforts to change eco
nomic rights and policies as a move from individual freedom to government
intervention. Judges claimed that by striking down labor or consumer pro
tections, such as minimum wage and maximum hour legislation, they were
enforcing a constitutional right to freedom of contract. For example, in the
Lochner ruling, the Court decreed that constitutional freedom meant enforcing
an individual baker’s right to “choose” to work long hours at low wages in un
healthy conditions without government regulation (Lochner v. New York 1905).
Through this reasoning, the courts constructed the political power of workers
and other economically vulnerable groups to create different, and arguably bet
ter choices, as efforts to take away choice.
The key to reconstructing constrained choice as free choice was masking the
pervasive and powerful role of existing law—and government coercion—in re
stricting workers’ or consumers’ choices and privileging the wealthy. Any realworld market choice does not simply reflect the chooser’s individual desires,
but instead depends on others’ willingness and ability to satisfy that desire and
on the price of that satisfaction compared to other alternatives. What particular
options, at what prices, are available to a given worker, consumer, or entrepre
neur will, of course, depend on the context, and in particular on how the law
distributes and regulates property and power. The baker who chooses to labor
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long hours at low wages to increase his income makes that choice against, for
example, a backdrop of law that gives the owner of the bakery rather than the
bakery worker the title to the profits made from the sale of the bread, along
with a backdrop of government force that gives that owner the right to call the
police if the bakery worker pockets the money from that sale (Hale 1952). Regu
lations of wages and hours only appear to be coercive government intervention
in a free market by obscuring the background legal systems, such as the rules
of corporate finance, property, tort, and contract and criminal justice, so that
these laws governing the existing market appear to represent a state of nature
affording perfect free choice (Sunstein 1987).
Second, the Lochner era opinions also supported an era of substantial gov
ernment control over vulnerable individuals by tending to define those seeking
more egalitarian government economic protections as dependent; that is, as
persons incapacitated from freedom, authority, and self-sufficiency (McClus
key 2003). This characterization could sometimes justify government protec
tion for some of those most at risk of losing out in the market. For example, the
Lochner era judiciary upheld minimum wage laws when applied to women, but
not to men (Muller v. Oregon 1908). This reasoning tended to mark those who
sought egalitarian economic protection as second-class and suspect citizens de
serving of extensive government control along with only meager or even illu
sory protection. For example, wage and hour limits that applied only to women
tended to work to enhance their economic marginality, enforcing low incomes
and exclusion from mainstream employment (Kessler-Harris 2001). When
workers successfully asserted their collective choice for better wages and work
conditions through supposedly private market bargaining by striking against
employers, federal courts often issued injunctions authorizing military inter
vention, thereby treating workers’ potential market freedom as unjust coercion
of more deserving market winners (Casebeer 1995).
As part of the New Deal’s dramatic shift in ideology and policy, prevailing
jurisprudence repudiated Lochner’s market fundamentalism and opened the
door to the twentieth-century welfare and regulatory state. By the end of the
1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court had rejected the idea that fundamental freedom
requires barring democratic policy measures aimed at advancing economic
equality. In undoing Lochner’s jurisprudence, courts partly rejected the opposi
tion between market choice and government coercion, instead reconstructing
expanded state and federal legislative and executive power as the product of
democratic political freedom (NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 1947). The
Court affirmed that the power to choose could mean not just the individual
freedom to decide whether the personal benefits of a particular job or product
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outweighed the costs, but also the freedom to assert collective power in state or
market to change the costs and benefits of particular decisions, thereby produc
ing a different, better array of choices for many.
Nonetheless, the United States’ renunciation of Lochner’s market fundamen
talism also served in part to reframe and legitimize many aspects of a milita
rized market ideal. The prevailing explanation of Lochner’s mistake was that it
wrongly made economic policies integral to political and civil rights, not that
it wrongly enforced a political economy with rules skewed to keep many from
political and economic power (Sunstein 1987). As a result, U.S. law stopped
short of joining the global trend to constitutionalize rights that would have
gone further to define economic and political power for nonelites as funda
mental to meaningful freedom (Sunstein 2006).

DELEGITIMIZING THE WELFARE STATE

Losing Choices
Although this post-Lochner separation of economics from basic political and
civil rights enabled the growth of a (limited) U.S. welfare state, it also set the
stage for its weakening in the late twentieth century. While government policies
promoting economic equality usually were not directly blocked by the Consti
tution, neither were many policies and institutions promoting the inegalitarian
and coercive concentration of economic and political power. By constructing
basic democratic freedom and equality in terms of government’s abstention
from disturbing a presumptively neutral process of politics and market, the pre
vailing legal framework has often continued the Lochner era’s naturalization of
extensive unequal losses and dangerous losers in need of control. If the process
of producing winners and losers in state and market is viewed as generally free,
then those who win will generally be seen to have made better choices, giving
them deserved authority to harness further power in market and all branches
of government to protect and enhance their gains.
The ideological definition of freedom as minimized government control
of economics contains a paradox. If true freedom equals unconstrained selfinterest maximizing in a harsh world of zero-sum competition for scarce re
sources, then the most freedom will come from imposing the most constraint
on others. The rational way to win an ideal competition for scarce resources
will not necessarily or normally be to choose the option that maximizes one’s
own benefits within given resource constraints. Instead, self-interested mar
ket actors will seek to get better choices by using public and private power to
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constrain others. By rejecting fundamental constitutional protection for broadbased economic security and equitable economic power, the post-Lochner legal
system set the stage for winners to build and concentrate gains by creating and
controlling more market (and state) losers. In a legal system that denies the
connections between economic power and political freedom, these constraints
on others’ choices will tend to be legitimated and protected as neutral politics,
economics, and law. Manipulating the imagined line between free market and
coercive politics is one of the most powerful ways of gaining market power to
limit others’ choices.
By the late twentieth century, wealthy elites used the rhetoric of market
freedom to help mobilize a broader coalition against the welfare state vision
spurred by the New Deal and expanded in new regulatory systems and gov
ernment social programs in the 1960s through the early 1970s (Phillips-Fein
2009). This coalition succeeded in weakening law reforms, establishing new le
gal rights for corporations, controlling regulatory agencies, influencing the ju
diciary, and building new political, academic, and legal institutions to advance
elite business interests. Indeed, this mobilization has helped to reestablish some
substantive constitutional protections for concentrated wealth in the guise of
basic due process and neutrality (McCluskey 2007).
This legal context has helped give material substance to the ideological
claim that the bad choices facing existing market losers are the tragic result
of scarce economic resources, not the unjust result of unequal political power.
For example, changes in the regulation of international trade and finance in the
1970s through the 1990s helped increase the mobility and volatility of capital
in relation to workers and communities. Those changes in background laws
helped make collective action for better wages—either through legislation or
labor organizing—a costlier choice more likely to risk capital flight (to jurisdic
tions with less state labor protection), and thereby jeopardize jobs and wages
for those workers and communities.
Conservative activists harnessed this real (but contingent and political) in
crease in scarcity to further advance the free market story. That story explained
that the only way to effectively resist this scarcity is to further loosen the con
straints on the market winners with the power to control the limited resources
on which others increasingly depend. In this view, workers, communities, and
nations faced with capital flight can only retain jobs or wealthy taxpayers, for
example, by further shifting taxes and market risk to those without the power
to transfer assets elsewhere, or by further directing government spending and
regulatory support to protect investors rather than schools, the environment,
public health, general infrastructure, or social services (Enrich 1996). Although
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promoted by conservatives, this story has convinced many across the political
spectrum in the United States since it exposes the real economic insecurity
perceived by many of the middle class in the late twentieth century.
But the argument that this market scarcity is inevitable, and inevitably per
petuated by market winners, is essentially an argument about power couched
in the language of impersonal, objective forces of economic incentives. If the
power to control others’ choices is a natural, fixed, infinitely resilient force, and
if that mysterious suprahuman irresistible force is called the market, then we
have little choice but to give in to the bad choices dictated by that market and
even to give that market more power to control our choices. By reifying the
power to control others’ choices, this idea of the market ironically makes those
bad and worse choices seem to be the route toward the best choices possible. If
the existing distribution of power to reap gains and avoid costs is inevitable and
natural, then accommodating that power will be the best option, since resisting
it will bring only further costs to those who lack that power. The credibility of
the free market story’s promise of eventual abundance, in the face of increasing
scarcity, depends on trusting that this unequal market power is nonetheless suf
ficiently diffuse and its concentrated gain so big that it eventually will spill over
to a significant number of others.
Controlling Losers
Welfare states and their beneficiaries have often taken political and economic
action to push back against neoliberalism’s losing choices. Yet welfare states
are under attack not just from neoliberal policies increasing global economic
competition, but also from renewed global assertions of overt and covert public
and private force that often have enabled a wealthy few to extract gains from the
majority of others.
As the U.S. economy, and its wealthy business owners and investors, be
came more threatened under global competition and increased nonelite po
litical power in the 1960s and 1970s, the prevailing policy response has been
not simply to win that competition by producing more and better economic
goods, but to enlist militarism and government control to change the global
and domestic rules of the game in the favor of the wealthy. As Chilean dictator
Pinochet explained in a 1979 speech written by his “Chicago Boys” free mar
ket economic advisors, democracy is only an expendable means to the more
important end of absolute economic freedom; or, as writer Eduardo Galeano
observed, Pinochet was “torturing people so prices could be free” (Grandin
2006, 175).
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Historian Greg Grandin explains how free market ideology ironically helped
promote a U.S. policy of heightened intervention through terror that brought
mass poverty, violence, and dictatorship to much of Latin America during the
late twentieth century (Grandin 2006). Many of the democratic welfare states
or egalitarian political movements that grew around the globe after the fall of
colonialism and World War II lost ground or failed in significant part because
they appeared too powerful in that global competition, not too weak. Gran
din argues that U.S. leaders inverted moral rhetoric about democratic freedom,
joining moral and market fundamentalism, to justify military intervention that
undermined the choice to increase economic and political equality in Latin
American countries through the 1980s. In that period, the United States helped
prevent El Salvador from becoming a more democratic, egalitarian, and eco
nomically successful state not simply by promoting free market ideas, but also
by spending over a million dollars a day for a decade to support a military
counterinsurgency operating through what a 1991 U.S. Defense Department re
port called “lavish brutality”—death squads willing and able to murder thou
sands of people (Grandin 2006, 71, 98, 105). These Latin American policies
have served as a model for foreign policy in the Middle East, where lofty claims
of promoting democracy and free market prosperity have been accompanied
by the pillaging of resources and assets, rampant violence, and infrastructure
destruction along with new systems of military rule backed by murder, torture,
extra-legal detention, and long-term foreign occupation.
Within the United States, criminalization has long been used to control those
whose occasional market winnings have been contrary to the moral order. The
combined rise of market and moral ideology constructing poverty as the result
of bad choices has helped to rationalize the growth of government control over
those whose winnings threaten to undermine the gains of market elites. In the
1980s and 1990s, new policies of mass incarceration placed large numbers of
poor people of color under militarized control, often for participating in the
illegal drug market in the absence of better alternatives for jobs or family care.
In addition, this growth of the criminal justice industry increased economic
and political pressure on government to further divert government spending
from social support for better choices to authoritarian control of choice. This
criminalization of poverty has contributed to an escalating system of public
and private violence in poor communities. Incarceration leaves many families
and communities without access to support necessary for legitimate market
success, thereby encouraging further dependence on violent gangs and illegal
activity.
In addition to incarceration, the withdrawal of welfare support for poor
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mothers has subjected many poor families of color to the public control of the
child welfare system, as children subject to unsafe communities and poverty
are removed to the sometimes violent and often inadequately supported fos
ter care system. Criminalization and militarization of immigration, combined
with neoliberal policies driving many outside the United States to illegal migra
tion and many employers within the United States to rely on cheaper or more
vulnerable immigrant labor, has meant that work opportunities often lead to
state detention and policing along with private denial of rights.
These policies of force and insecurity can nonetheless appear as beacons
of freedom and opportunity through an ideological lens that dismisses and
justifies this force and devastation as marginal or temporary side effects to
those whose failures prove their moral and economic inferiority. In contrast,
decreased policing and decriminalization of unlawful cost-shifting by power
ful economic winners is excused by market and moral ideology romanticizing
their gains as a sign of superior power, or rationalized as the inevitable price of
encouraging entrepreneurial risk-taking and ambition that will lead to long
term prosperity.
Losing Choice and Control in Welfare Reform
One key symbol of the late twentieth-century ideological turn away from the
welfare state to the free market (and to moral conservatism) was the 1996 fed
eral legislation eliminating Aid to Families with Dependent Children (afdc).
Examining the role of choice and control in the political debate about this
symbol of welfare reform sheds light on the reasoning that naturalizes govern
ment enforcement of losing choices and control over losers as enhanced market
freedom.
The former afdc program, which grew out of the New Deal’s Social Secu
rity Act and was significantly expanded in the 1960s, provided an alternative
to work income for impoverished single parents (mostly mothers). In its place,
Congress established a new program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Fami
lies (tanf), which made access to benefits not a matter of individual right, but
contingent on discretionary allocations from federal block grants to states (Per
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996). This
federal funding was subject to state compliance with a number of requirements
designed to limit individual benefits, to move recipients into the workplace, to
encourage marriage, and to discourage teenaged single parenting (Handler and
Hasenfeld 1997).
In the prevailing political view, these restrictions increased individual op
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portunity for meaningful choice by replacing afdc’s policy of dependency
on government benefits with a policy of market participation. Policy experts
and popular opinion both held that government income support had, in fact,
harmed impoverished single mothers and their children by distorting their
choices about work, marriage, and family (Mead 2001). Indeed, afdc tended
to offer poor families losing choices. Not only were benefits often too low to
sustain families in the short run, but also those benefits could hinder oppor
tunities for long-term security because they were conditioned on low income
levels that generally precluded formal work or marriage to a worker. As a result,
many single mothers felt compelled to supplement this aid with informal work
and family relationships that could exacerbate their economic instability, their
exclusion from mainstream opportunities, and their vulnerability to violence
or addiction.
But beyond the rhetoric of increased “work opportunity” (used in the title
of the tanf legislation), in its design and implementation tanf has tended
to produce tightened government control of single mothers in poverty, leav
ing many with much worse options. The change to tanf has restricted access
to government income support that could sometimes provide an alternative
source of income to single mothers seeking to escape harmful jobs, harmful
child care, or harmful intimate relationships. By limiting that alternative (or
making it more costly to access), tanf tends to give impoverished single moth
ers even less power than afdc to hold out for better choices for work and fam
ily (McCluskey 2003).
By identifying formal wage work with a naturalized market and government
welfare with perverse politics, free market ideology helped present that shift
from bad to worse choices as a move toward legitimate freedom and oppor
tunity for single mothers in poverty. Advocates of welfare reform character
ized government income support for impoverished families as redistribution
that shifts the real market costs of having and raising children onto those who
do not voluntarily choose to assume those costs—that is, taxpayers, many of
whom are struggling working parents themselves (McCluskey 2005). This view
led to the conclusion that the high costs of work for single mothers (such as
poor child care, low wages, high commuting expenses, or poor health) are a
problem of irresponsible personal choices to bear and raise children without
first establishing economic security (Solinger 2002).
This logic about responsible choice also rationalized tanf’s increase in pu
nitive regulation of welfare recipients’ behavior. Government controls on indi
vidual choice, such as caps on benefits designed to reduce family size, marriage
incentives, or workfare requirements, seem to be a way to increase responsible
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personal choice by ensuring that recipients pay what are deemed to be the real
market costs of single parenting. In this view, social and legal structures that
privatize much of the responsibility for raising children to gendered and un
paid work within the family are presumed to be natural and normal systems
of voluntary choice. Similarly, this view presents jobs with low wages and poor
working conditions as normal and necessary features of the labor market. This
picture thereby obscures how low-wage work is produced by government poli
cies protecting the interests of employers and investors—such as the failure to
adjust the minimum wage to keep up with inflation, or the failure to vigorously
enforce antidiscrimination laws, or legal barriers to robust unionization. By
obscuring the policies that help make single parenthood so costly, the use of
government power to force single mothers to personally bear the high costs
of combining work and family can seem not only to enhance their own free
dom, but to expand other people’s choices. In the free market story, replacing
government redistribution with efficient pricing maximizes overall growth, so
that welfare reform could be perceived as a way of enhancing middle-class job
opportunities rather than creating more low-wage competition, which is likely
to depress wages.
In response to these free market arguments, advocates of more generous
welfare support often portrayed welfare recipients as incapable of free choice.
Instead of challenging the assumptions of the naturalized market, these argu
ments attempted to place single mothers outside of its reach by emphasizing the
degree to which jobs, husbands, or meaningful birth control are unavailable,
or the degree to which impoverished women or children lack the knowledge
or freedom from others’ control to make choices that rationally advance their
interest (Graetz and Mashaw 1999). But such arguments can logically reinforce
the free market attacks on welfare and its recipients. The structural barriers that
often give poor mothers losing choices were frequently constructed as lying
outside the market—produced by cultural constraints, individual incapacity,
or exceptional market failures—rather than the product of a political economy
normally structured to shift downward much of the costs of work and family
(McCluskey 2003). If the barriers to choice are viewed as outside the normal
market, welfare state protections from those bad choices will likewise seem de
signed to protect people from normal market choices. Free market opponents
of welfare protections, in contrast, could claim that they were the ones who
truly respected poor mothers by treating them as capable of making free and
responsible choices to advance their family’s interests in the market. By con
structing “liberal” defenders of welfare as denying recipients’ power to choose,
critics could portray liberal support for welfare as patronizing or even as a form
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of covert exploitation driven by a wasteful government bureaucracy and selfserving poverty industry.
At the same time, this liberal emphasis on welfare recipients’ incapacity for
good choices reinforced the conservative welfare critics’ arguments for stricter
government controls on poor mothers’ behavior and for less generous support
for their families. Popular and political opposition to welfare programs has long
been fanned by accusations of widespread fraud. Portraying welfare recipients
as freely rational but immoral actors, reform advocates used racial and sexual
stereotypes to blame poor mothers for shirking the real costs of their own shortterm, self-centered gain, indulgently choosing laziness over work and sexual
profligacy or careless pregnancy over marriage while expecting taxpayers or
their children to pick up the costs (Neubeck and Cazenave 2001; Gilens 1999).
In contrast, during the New Deal, advocates of the program that became
afdc explained that its purpose involved giving poor mothers better choices.
Focusing on widowed white mothers, proponents emphasized the benefits of
helping white, formerly middle class, women to stay out of wage work to in
crease maternal time with their children, allowing the family to go to church
together, for example (Solinger 2002). The economic pressure for hasty remar
riage, dangerous or exploitative work (in factories, farms, or prostitution), with
children neglected or abandoned to orphanages or to their own work, was not
in this view the real or necessary price of white widowhood. That is, this view
of free and responsible choice did not require forcing poor widows to bear the
market consequences of their irresponsible decision to enjoy the benefits of
children and marriage without accumulating sufficient property wealth, life in
surance, or paternal health to protect against the economic risks of a breadwin
ning father’s premature death. Instead, welfare proponents constructed gov
ernment support for white widows as a way to encourage virtuous maternal
investment in their children’s well-being for the benefit of society overall.
If government welfare support is understood to advance rights to better
market choices, rather than to protect against bad market choices, then the
recipients of that support will seem more deserving of political power as well
as market gains. Of course, the question of whose winnings from market and
political power are natural and normal to a good society, and whose gains are
artificial and dangerous, will be answered by making moral judgments about
what and who count in measuring social and personal good. What gets con
strued as an expansion of market-enhancing choice versus market-inhibiting
coercion that cannot be a matter of technical cost-benefit calculation, scientific
laws, supply and demand, or neat separation of economics from politics. As
afdc became more publicly identified with and available to unmarried moth
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ers of color, inegalitarian race and gender ideology supported the idea that its
benefits involve government coercion to protect irresponsible choice to the det
riment of overall market growth and security. In short, to draw the line between
choice and coercion, we need to decide who deserves the power to choose, and
on what terms.

THE MILITARIZED MARKET IN CRISIS

Big Losers, Bad Choices
The 2008 financial market crisis starkly presented the two strategic steps link
ing market freedom with forceful control. First, it collapsed the market prom
ise of dazzling expansion of choice into a reality of stunningly losing choices.
Trillions of dollars of imagined financial and housing market gains evaporated,
representing not innovative expansion of societal resources, but instead a sys
tem of speculation that shifted and concealed mounting risk with little sus
tainable benefit. Former federal banking regulator William K. Black explained
that this crisis was produced by systemic, normalized fraud at all levels of the
financial system, as high profits in financial and real estate markets increas
ingly depended on falsifying and hiding the high risk of loss (Moyers 2009). As
the smoke and mirrors cleared, many financial institutions, businesses, govern
ments, individuals, and organizations have been left with high debts and highly
risky assets now recognized as having low value. In addition to producing these
losses, the years of heavy investment in illusory, short-term, or narrowly dis
tributed gains has siphoned off resources from what could have been more se
cure and widely spread economic growth.
Although the resulting heightened economic scarcity has exacerbated the
losing choices for most, some of the central winners from the speculative
bubble have been treated as too big to fail. Despite the overwhelming biparti
san unpopularity of financial market bailouts at the end of 2008, political and
economic leaders confronted the reality that if the major Wall Street players
were left to pay the bill for their ill-gotten and illusory gains, a bill large enough
to destroy many existing financial institutions, then Wall Street would bring
down Main Street along with it. In the current system, Main Streets around
the world depend on Wall Street for capital and credit. Having and wielding
market power, after all, means the power to control others’ alternatives so that
others will have no choice but to pay a high price for what they need. With
Wall Street’s gun at its head, Congressional Democrats and the new Obama
administration put down their rhetoric of egalitarian economic and political
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change, and handed over virtually unimaginable amounts of government funds
and credit to financial institutions that had been involved in producing colossal
failure.
Along with bad economic choices, this crisis brought glimpses of height
ened militarization and authoritarian control of the increasing numbers of dev
astated losers. This rule of force threatens to come at a number of levels. First,
ongoing military misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, driven in part by po
litical power to reap private gains from oil, arms sales, and defense contracts,
present losing choices for those who might be concerned that the price of this
military action is too high. Once military occupation and destruction has exac
erbated socioeconomic and political insecurity, the resulting disorder threatens
to spill over national borders and to fuel the further global growth of warfare
and terror—becoming too big a failure to be abandoned (Scahill 2009). But
continuing military control offers little hope of doing anything but increasing
this threatening insecurity (Gall 2009). At the same time, efforts to address the
economic crisis through increased funding for the structures that will lead to
economic growth and security in the United States and beyond are hampered
by the enormous, continued cost of these military quagmires (Berrigan 2009).
Second, severe economic devastation is likely to bring despair and the break
down of security that leads both to a surge in the power of private violence
to limit peoples’ lives and freedom and also a surge in public force to secure
against that violence (Klare 2009). A number of mass shootings and murdersuicides in the United States appear linked to loss of jobs or homes in the crisis.
Around the globe, economic collapse threatens to exacerbate the decline of the
power of some nations to effectively control violent drug gangs, warlords, slave
traffickers, and pirates, leading again to the increased militarization of borders
and to the militarization of work and business for many.
Third, as the Wall Street winners walk away from their failures with lavish
bonuses, some in the United States seek to pin responsibility for massive eco
nomic failure on the usually suspected losers. Right-wing pundits have heaped
blame for the underlying mortgage crisis on poor, urban people of color, on
the dubious theory that liberal government antidiscrimination laws (enacted
in earlier decades) forced hapless and defenseless bankers to provide irrespon
sible loans to those undeserving of homeownership. This new mobilization of
timeworn blame may help justify or excuse further policies of punishment and
control of the racialized poor.
Fourth, the economic crisis brings the risk that it will be more difficult to
mobilize the government resources and power to effectively police the fraudu
lent risk-shifting that helped to produce the crisis. Government power to hold
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winners accountable to the law, and to prevent continued coercive winnings,
may be jeopardized if the crisis increases the concentration of private power to
control credit. In addition to increasing its political dependence on Wall Street
financiers, the U.S. government may increase its efforts to seek funds from for
eign governments whose economic might is partly tied to military power. That
perceived dependence may exacerbate economic pressure to accommodate
rather than challenge foreign policies undermining political dissent and human
rights. Again, the result could be increasing unequal international and national
policing of vulnerable market losers in a context where winners remain above
the law.
Controlling Winners, Becoming Choosers
To solve the financial crisis, many free market advocates admit the need for
new government funding and regulation, but they tend to advocate structuring
that intervention to better enhance the power of market winners to withstand
market cycles or “systemic” risk (Posner 2009). In the free market story, gov
ernment support that strengthens the market must be sharply distinguished
from government intervention that overpowers the market. Although that line
between supporting and supplanting the market seems to protect individual
choice from government power, it instead reserves government backing for the
power to choose as an elite privilege.
To increase winning choices for those losing out in the recent crisis, market
regulation would need to affirmatively create alternatives to existing market
power. As long as the large banks, insurers, and other financial institutions
control the supply of credit and capital, for example, then they will be able to
continue to shift much of the costs of their gain to those who depend on that
supply. If government financial backing simply replenishes the supply of credit
and capital of existing institutions without major changes in control, it is likely
that the credit supply will continue to be in need of further government replen
ishing. That funding is likely to be directed toward continuing to secure shortterm returns for managers and investors at the expense of others.
If government is in fact a vital supplier of the credit needed to stabilize the
market, then the price of that credit could be cheaper if the government supply
were structured to effectively compete against, rather than cooperate with,
those large failed institutions. It is logically possible, for example, that a govern
ment competitor could reduce risks through greater transparency and greater
checks on illusory and fraudulent gains, and to prioritize sustainable gains to
borrowers and society rather than short-term gains to managers and investors.

42 • Martha T. McCluskey

That public financial competitor could come in a variety of forms, such as new
public financial institutions, increased government control and redirection of
private institutions receiving government funds, or redirection of government
funding toward smaller, specialized banks and other institutions designed to
serve small business development and homeowners more than wealthy specu
lators.
However, the free market rhetoric celebrating choice and consumer sover
eignty is not so easily turned toward policies that would meaningfully improve
the choices for most borrowers and taxpayers. Despite the logic of joining public
control to public funding, the free market story emphasizes that concentrated
private power is necessary for economic growth, because democratic govern
ment can only create the illusion of abundance. In this theory, the market forces
real and responsible choices because it is driven by natural laws of supply and
demand rather than by political artifice. It warns that government control by
definition avoids hard choices, giving into irrational demands of special inter
ests to increase waste and scarcity in the long run. For example, this theory sug
gests that although populist outrage might push government-controlled finan
cial institutions to cut executive compensation, if that compensation is below
the presumed market price for skilled leadership, then it will lead to incompe
tent managers who will squander resources in the long run. Or, more plausibly,
it cautions that government-controlled financial institutions will be induced to
steer credit toward powerful political players and their constituents, regardless
of real risk, diverting investment away from the most productive uses likely to
increase and spread economic growth.
Despite dampened faith that the market naturally corrects private managers
and investors who pursue short-term gains without regard for long-term costs,
the free market story nonetheless presents this market failure as an aberration
set apart from and against a norm of government failure. As a result, the pre
vailing regulatory response to the crisis has been to concentrate more control
in a federal super-regulator protecting the super-financiers rather than to break
up and segregate financial institutions so that they are more amenable to trans
parent and democratic regulation (Greider 2009, 2010).
The free market story rejects expanded and improved private choices, as
well as expanded democratic control, on the theory that the benefits of the
free market depend on controlling the bargaining power of nonelites. An
other economic policy reform recently before Congress has been the Employee
Free Choice Act, which would provide for unionization based on a process of
signing membership cards rather than an electoral process regulated to give
employers more power to contest and control union organizing efforts. Op
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position to that law has gained broad political legitimacy based on arguments
that increased unionization violates natural scarcity. According to legal expert
Richard Epstein, this increased choice—and power —for workers will increase
capital flight, thereby hurting not just politicians’ campaign financing but also
destroying jobs and depressing wages (Epstein 2009).
In effect, such arguments naturalize a given distribution of political and
economic bargaining power as a mysterious, but ultimately beneficial, market
transcending human intentions. That is, these arguments suggest that true free
dom of choice for most consists of ceding power to make meaningful choices,
submitting to the control of those with the most power to gain at most oth
ers’ expense. This perverse conclusion follows from the theory that those elite
gains naturally and normally represent the natural, normally beneficial moral,
economic, and political order. That grim “choice” to lose meaningful choices
retains substantial power to win popular appeal and expert approval because of
a lack of faith in alternatives. In the face of concentrated and globalized market
power, government promises of increased abundance often seem hollow.
This embrace of the market’s losing choices out of a sense of ultimate choice
lessness stems from an assumption that real power is beyond the control of
democratic politics or law. The possibility that government can produce abun
dance—better choices —depends on the government being able to shift its
power from controlling market losers to extending the rule of law over power
ful economic winners. Fostering and sustaining better choices requires not just
providing and controlling an alternative supply of resources, but also increasing
democratic political control over the economic institutions that structure the
market.
The recent financial crisis has reinforced cynicism about the possibilities for
popular control, since it underscores the extent to which government, experts,
debtors, and investors all can be swayed or misled into mistaking highly con
centrated short-term gains to elites for broad-based security and prosperity.
But the real alternative to the threat of undemocratic government power is not
an imaginary free market beyond human agency, but instead a government
and economy directly structured to enhance democratic ends. When political
leaders assure us that public funding of private businesses such as American In
ternational Group or General Motors will not lead to public control, they evoke
the Lochner era’s passive idea of democracy. In that ideology, government ac
tion that sought better choices was itself a sign of dependency deserving of
control and exclusion more than economic and political power.
Ironically, acquiescence in the market’s bad choices has sometimes become a
superficial badge of deserving citizenship status, differentiating market players
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who can dream of winning big from the real losers outside the game. A culture
of white masculine military toughness can reinforce the idea that accepting
rather than resisting losing choices is a sign of mature and rational indepen
dence. In this culture, choosing to lose rather than to change the rules in a game
with others who are more powerful makes one a good sport, deserving of the
approval of those with greater strength. In contrast, the prevailing culture often
disparages government protection against economic insecurity as a feminized
and racialized “nanny state” in which better economic choices became unre
alistic or perverse nursery tales appropriate for “girlie men” not capable of he
roic self-sacrifice (McCluskey 2007). For example, campaigning for Republican
nominee John McCain in the 2008 presidential election, California Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger used images of feminized physical weakness—such as
“skinny legs”—to mock opponent Obama’s allegedly egalitarian economic poli
cies as “unaffordable” and unsuitable for an “action hero” like McCain (Cam
panile 2008).
This sense of choicelessness pervaded the recent debate over health insur
ance, an urgently gaping hole in the U.S. welfare state that has widened as jobs
providing private health insurance become more scarce in the wake of the fi
nancial crisis. Supporters of President Obama’s health insurance reform initia
tive debated the question of creating a public option to compete with private
insurance instead of simply expanding government support for the private
insurers who have largely failed to provide adequate, affordable coverage. By
framing public health insurance as an additional choice, proponents of the
public option appropriated the market rhetoric that had helped undermine
previous reform efforts.
In response, opponents of the public insurance alternative warned that de
parting from the free market threatens individual choice by offering choices
that challenge the natural scarcity that supposedly brings real security. For ex
ample, prominent economist Gregory Mankiw criticized the idea that a public
health insurance option might be able to provide better and cheaper coverage
for most people (Mankiw 2009). He admitted that government health insur
ance, like Medicare, can produce major administrative savings, potentially in
creasing resources for health care. Furthermore, he emphasized that a govern
ment health insurer would be likely to reduce costs by wielding greater market
bargaining power over health care providers. Nonetheless, using the standard
argument of false abundance, Mankiw suggested that the “choice” to buy more
health care at lower cost to patients would nonetheless be an irresponsible de
nial of market scarcity. Because some health care providers could lose money,
and because some of those providers might have the power to protect their
interests by reducing the quality or quantity of their services, he concluded that
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consumers would have worse choices in the end. His analysis assumed that the
current prices charged by health care providers are natural, necessary, com
petitive, and beneficial to consumers (and providers) rather than the result of
unequal public and private bargaining power by private insurance companies
and specialized medical providers largely protected against competition and
innovation. He raised the specter of government rationing to explain why we
cannot expect much better choices from government reform of the health in
surance market.
To create a political culture where government action for better choices ap
pears more credible and more powerful, it will be necessary to challenge not
only the naturalization of scarcity, but also the naturalization of economic los
ers as moral failures undeserving of better choices in a better economic and
political game. The moral problem with Lochner was not simply that unelected
judges imposed a normative preference for economic growth over equality—a
policy choice better left to democratic process—rather, the Lochner era rulings
were problematic in their moral belief that ordinary workers or consumers did
not normally deserve to have equal legal power to control economic growth for
their own interests. Similarly, tanf’s rejection of the New Deal era’s support
for some single mothers reflects the moral and political idea that poor single
mothers do not deserve to assert power at work and in the family (drawing on
racial and sexual ideology), not a new emphasis on market choice over gov
ernment protection. In the recent health insurance reform debate, “tea party”
activists joined economic experts in insisting that freedom and dignity for most
requires accepting the current situation of costly, scarce, and insecure health
insurance protection. Finally, the losing choices presented to the general public
in response to the recent financial crisis likewise depend on the construction
of a public consisting of voters, workers, and consumers who are not deserving
of the responsibility and power to choose—and so must have their organized
power subject to the control of elite others, whether in a super-regulator or
supervised union election.
In contrast, as a number of countries in Latin America have recently emerged
from military control to greater democracy, their leaders have asserted polit
ical, legal, and cultural power to claim better economic choices for more of
their citizens. Resisting the ideology of scarcity imposed by market and moral
fundamentalism, these countries now provide a range of possible examples of
democratic efforts to change the rules of law and market to seize public con
trol of natural resources, and to organizing alternative supplies of credit and
investment to increase the power to bargain for a greater share of the gains of
economic development.
In conclusion, the rhetorical and ideological separation of the market from
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government helps legitimate constraints on meaningful individual choice by
naturalizing control and coercion as the result of beneficial and liberating eco
nomic forces. Substituting overt government power and control for the illusion
of natural market freedom does not, however, necessarily bring the increased
freedom and security of better choices for most. Government involvement
in the financial crisis, in health care, and in welfare programs is not naturally
separate or separable from coercive and unequal market bargaining power any
more than the market is separate from government.
To undo the two strategic steps whereby public and private structures pro
duce losing choices and pressure for increased control of those who bear those
losses, we must translate the question of choice into a question of power. The
Lochner era rulings were wrong because they presented power as a matter of
freedom from coercion separate from the freedom to organize, institutional
ize, and regulate the rules determining the terms and boundaries of individual
choices. Government regulation of the market has often failed to provide better
choices— whether for workers, single mothers, or borrowers— not because that
intervention has been coercive or paternalistic, and not because better choices
inevitably lie outside human power. Instead, effective policies providing better
choices and more capacity for freedom require structures aimed at changing
the power to bargain for a greater share of resources both in state and market.
Those policies of better choices require challenging a moral order in which
economic vulnerability is linked to moral, legal, and political incapacity. More
equal government economic security is compatible with, and indeed necessary
for, more political and economic freedom. Achieving both freedom and secu
rity depends on a legal system structured to assume more equal authority to
have better choices and more equal responsibility for choosing to gain in ways
that minimize others’ losses.
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